History Sino-Vietnamese War

VIETNAM'S BLOODY DEFEAT OF CHINA

The Sino-Vietnamese war ( 中越战争 Zhōng-Yuè Zhànzhēng in Chinese) was fought between the

People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from February 17 to March 16,

1979. The PRC launched the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of

Cambodia and persecution of ethnic Chinese, which ended the reign of the PRC-backed

Khmer Rouge.

 

Map of Vietnamese-Chinese border, click to enlarge

 

 

In 1979, China invaded Vietnam. After very heavy fighting, the Chinese "opened the gates" to

Vietnam's capital Hanoi within a month and then withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese countryside

in ruins.  The purpose of the conflict was to 1. Force Vietnam to cede the disputed land border

territories 2. demonstrate to Vietnam that the USSR will not militarily intervene against China and

honor their defense treaty 3.If possible, force Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia  China failed

to force the Vietnamese to leave Cambodia, however after the war, the Chinese occupied the

disputed territories along the border. In 2000, these territories were officially given to China.

 

 

 CBS news reports on rising tension between Vietnam

and China over Cambodia .

 

 

 

 

Chinese Military Strategy in the

Third Indochina War

 This well-researched volume examines the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of the late

1970s and 1980s, attempting to understand them as strategic, operational and tactical

events. The Sino-Vietnamese War was the third Indochina war, and contemporary Southeast

Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the Vietnamese fought

three, not two, wars to establish their current role in the region. The war was not about the

Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently claimed, but about China's support for its

Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, and the book addresses US and ASEAN involvement in

the effort to support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in

March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia at least

until 1988, but it was evident by 1984-85 that the PLA, held back by the drag of its 'Maoist'

organization, doctrine, equipment, and personnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion.

Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest to all students of the

Third Indochina War, Asian political history, Chinese security and strategic studies in general.

 

The Sino-Vietnamese war ( 中越战争in Chinese,  in Vietnamese )

was fought between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from

February 17 to March 16, 1979. The PRC launched the offensive in response to Vietnam's

invasion and occupation of Cambodia and persecution of ethnic Chinese, which ended the reign

of the PRC-backed Khmer Rouge.

 

 

 

Chinese Army surplus shoes

Great for Gardening, Camping & Hiking, Climbing, super light !

 

 

 

Vietnamese soldiers on a destroyed Chinese 8th Army tank

  

Pro-Vietnamese video on the war . Some Chinese soldiers called it a "painful, little war."

Vietnamese troops avoided battle and instead harassed PLA forces. Some Chinese officers

described it as a "ghost war," since the enemy troops were almost invisible, or a "shadow war,"

since it seemed they were fighting against their own shadows. The Vietnamese troops employed

the same tactics, made the same moves, and used the same weapons as the Chinese. They

knew exactly what the Chinese were trying to do. They exploited almost every problem and

weakness the Chinese had. The Chinese troops had to fight their own problems first before they

could fight the Vietnamese. Deng's border war taught the PLA a hard lesson....

 

Many of the PLA's commanding officers were shocked by the poor discipline, low morale,

combat ineffectiveness, and high casualties in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. During the

nineteen days of the first two phases, the PLA suffered 26,000 casualties, about 1,350 per day.

Gerald Segal points out that in Vietnam, "in contrast to Korea, Chinese troops performed

poorly. In Korea, they adequately defended North Korea, but in 1979 they failed to punish

Vietnam. China's Cambodian allies were relegated to a sideshow along the Thai frontier, and

China was unable to help them break out."During the war, 37,300 Vietnamese troops were

killed, and 2,300 were captured. The Soviet Union surprised the Vietnamese by refusing to get

involved in the conflict. On February 18, Moscow had denounced China's aggression and

promised that the Soviet Union would keep its commitments according to the Soviet-Vietnam

cooperation and friendship treaty. Then, however, the Soviet Union did not make any major

moves. Russian military intelligence did increase its reconnaissance planes and ships in the

South China Sea and along the Vietnamese coast after China's invasion. On February 24, two

Russian transport planes landed at Hanoi and unloaded some military equipment. Most

countries maintained a neutral position during the Sino-Vietnamese War.  

 

The brief war was a grievous misfortune for both China and Vietnam, not only because it

resulted in material and human losses for both nations but also because it brought years of

earlier cooperation to a dispiriting conclusion. The war showed that American belief in the

domino theory was misplaced, since two Communist countries, one of which had just attained

national liberation, were now in conflict with each other. Each valued its own national interests

much more than the common Communist ideology. On February 27, 1979, Deng told American

journalists in Beijing that "Vietnam claims itself as the third military superpower in the world. We

are eliminating this myth. That's all we want, no other purpose. We don't want their territory. We

make them to understand that they can't do whatever they want to all the times."

 

Hanoi believed, however, that the Vietnamese army had taught the Chinese army a lesson. One

[People's Army of Vietnam] general said that China lost militarily and beat a hasty retreat: "After

we defeated them we gave them the red carpet to leave Vietnam." As Henry J. Kenny points out,

"Most Western writers agree that Vietnam had indeed outperformed the PLA on the

battlefield, but say that with the seizure of Lang Son, the PLA was poised to move into the

militarily more hospitable terrain of the Red River Delta, and thence to Hanoi." Kenny, however,

points out that Lang Son is less than twelve miles from the Chinese border but is twice that

distance from the delta. Moreover, at least five PAVN divisions remained poised for a

counterattack in the delta, and thirty thousand additional PAVN troops from Cambodia,

along with several regiments from Laos, were moving to their support. Thus the PLA would

have taken huge losses in any southward move toward Hanoi.

 

Although the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer Rouge had previously cooperated, the

relationship deteriorated when Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot came to power and established

Democratic Kampuchea. The Cambodian regime demanded that certain tracts of land be

"returned" to Cambodia, lands that had been "lost" centuries earlier. Unsurprisingly, the

Vietnamese refused the demands, and Pol Pot responded by massacring ethnic Vietnamese

inside Cambodia (see History of Cambodia), and, by 1978, supporting a Vietnamese guerrilla

army making incursions into western Vietnam.

 

"Wreaths at the Foot of the Mountain" (高山下的花环) is a 1984 Chinese film about the life of the

soldiers in a PLA army company before, during and after the Sino-Vietnamese War.

 

 

 

Realizing that Cambodia was being supported by the PRC, Vietnam approached the Soviets

about possible actions. The Soviets saw this as a major opportunity. The Vietnamese army, fresh

from combat with the US's ground forces, would easily be able to defeat the Cambodian forces.

This would not only remove the only major PRC-aligned political force in the area but also

demonstrate the benefits of being aligned with the USSR. The Vietnamese were equally excited

about the potential outcome. Laos was already a strong ally; if Cambodia could be "turned,"

Vietnam would emerge as a major regional power, political master of Indochina.

 

 

 

 

Video overview of the Sino Vietnamese War

The Vietnamese feared reprisals from the PRC. Over a period of several months in 1978, the

Soviets made it clear that they were supporting the Vietnamese against Cambodian incursions

. They felt this political show of force would keep the Chinese out of any sort of direct

confrontation, allowing the Vietnamese and Cambodians to fight out what was to some

extent a Sino-Soviet war by proxy.

 

In late 1978, the Vietnamese military invaded Cambodia. As expected, their experienced and

well-equipped troops had little difficulty defeating the Khmer Rouge forces. On January 7, 1979

Vietnamese-backed Cambodian forces seized Phnom Penh, thus ending the Khmer Rouge

regime.

 

Thus, according to the official Chinese view, the racially biased expulsion and persecution of

ethnic Chinese in Vietnam (Hoa) within Vietnam that began in the late 1970s was one of the

reasons. Persecution began when Vietnamese Chinese were stripped of their Vietnamese

citizenship as well as rights to own businesses and hold political positions of any kind. Within

the cities, large Chinese-owned businesses were seized by the Vietnamese government and

their goods confiscated overnight. Any remaining small businesses were subjected to additional

taxation not applicable to ethnic Vietnamese-owned business. The Vietnamese government's

rationale regarding these actions was to prevent disruption in services and goods in the

event that the ethnic Chinese population in Vietnam chose to sympathize with China if conflict

arose between the two countries. Vietnamese Chinese living near the China-Vietnam border

were simply forced back into Chinese territory.

 

The second and more official reason for the Chinese incursion into Vietnamese territory was

Vietnam's intrusion onto the Spratly Islands chain; claimed by China as her territory. Vietnamese

Navy vessels would move into the area, then fire at Chinese fishermen if they were found

operating in the area. Military establishments were also built in the face of official protest

by the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. These Vietnamese actions

were viewed by the Chinese Government as provocative and aggressive.

 

The third reason was the ongoing issue of the artillery harassment of frontier villages and

agricultural assets on the Chinese side by the Vietnamese army. Farmlands could not be

cultivated due to risk from explosions, created by Vietnamese artillery impacts. This affected the

local economy and decreased productivity. Subsequently, this led to dissent amongst the local

population regarding the Chinese government's inaction. As a result, this further raised

cross-border tensions and escalated the situation.

 

 

On February 15, 1979 the PRC publicly announced their intention to strike back at the

Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Few observers realized the symbolic importance of this

date. In an attempt to disrupt Vietnam, PRC snipers killed Vietnamese along the

Chinese-Vietnam border. It marked the expiration of the 30 year-old 1950 Sino-Soviet

Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and thus the first time that the PRC could strike back a

Soviet ally without breaking their own treaties. The reason cited for the counter strike was

the supposed mistreatment of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese minority and the Vietnamese

occupation of the Spratly Islands (claimed by the PRC).

 

Chinese forces

 

Two days later, on February 17, a PRC force of about 85,000 supported by 200 tanks from the

PRC People's Liberation Army entered northern Vietnam. The Chinese force consisted of units

from the Kunming Military Region—later abolished—and the Guangzhou Military Region. Troops

from both military regions had been assigned to assist Vietnam in its struggle against the United

States just a few years earlier during the Vietnam War. Contrary to the belief that over 200,000

Chinese troops entered Vietnam, the actual number was only 85,000. However, 200,000 Chinese

troops were mobilized, of which 100,000 were deployed away from their original bases. Around

400 tanks were also deployed.

 

   

  

Chinese female fighters and entertaing the troops

 

 

The Chinese troop deployments were observed by US spy satellites, and the KH-9 Big Bird

photographic reconnaissance satellite played an important role. In his state visit to the US

in 1979, the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was presented with this information

and asked to confirm the numbers. He replied that the information was completely accurate.

After this public confirmation in the U.S., the domestic Chinese media were finally allowed to

report on these deployments.

 

Vietnamese soldiers with RPGs

 

Vietnamese forces

 

Many of Vietnam's elite troops were in Cambodia keeping a tight grip on its newly occupied

territory. The Vietnamese government claimed they left only a force of about 70,000 including

several army regular divisions and divisions of the Public Security Army (the Vietnamese

equivalent of KGB border guards) in its northern area.

 

 

However, the Chinese encountered twice this number of Vietnamese forces as regular troops

were augmented by an additional large force of militias that outnumbered the regular force. This

concept of using local militias to fight the enemy has been a staple of Vietnamese defense

strategy since antiquity. The PLA managed to advance about forty kilometers into Vietnam, with

fighting mainly occurring in the provinces of Cao Bang, Lao Cai and Lang Son. On March 6, the

Chinese occupied the city of Lang Son. They claimed the gate to Hanoi was open, declared their

punitive mission achieved, and withdrew quickly. Their strategic aim of changing the situation in

Cambodia was not met.

 

Captured Chinese soldiers

 

Chinese casualties

 

To this day, both sides of the conflict describe themselves as the victor. The number of

casualties is disputed, with some Western sources claim PLA losses at more than 60,000

casualties, including about 26,000 killed

 

Captured Vietnamese soldiers

 

There were many reasons why it could be argued that the war was a disaster for the Chinese

armed forces. First, the Chinese military was using equipment and tactics from the era of

the Long March, World War II and the Korean war, which meant for example, that only Chinese

officers carried assault rifles, while the Vietnamese had more modern Soviet (and U.S.)

equipment, combined with assault rifles for every soldier.

 

Second, under Deng's order, China did not use their naval power and air force to suppress

enemy fire, neutralize strong points, and support their ground forces Therefore, the Chinese

ground forces were forced into absorbing the full impact of the Vietnamese forces' firepower.

 

Third, the PLA lacked adequate communications, transport, and logistics. Further, they were

burdened with an elaborate and archaic command structure which proved inefficient in the

FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area). Their maps were 75 years old. Runners were employed

to relay orders because there were few radios—those that they did have were not secure.

 

Fourth, China was one of the only two countries in the world at the time that lacked the

military rank system (the other being Albania), and thus commands were not effective.

 

Fifth, the Cultural Revolution had significantly weakened Chinese industry, and military hardware

produced suffered from poor quality, and thus did not perform well. Finally, the Chinese struck

back at an enemy that was highly trained, experienced, and confident due to successive victories

in wars with France, the U.S., and Cambodia.

 

Aftermath

 

Chinese Sino-Vietnamese

memorial

 

The legacy of the war is lasting, especially in Vietnam. The Chinese implemented an effective

"scorched-earth policy" while retreating back to China. They caused extensive damage to the

Vietnamese countryside and infrastructure, through destruction of Vietnamese villages,

roads, and railroads.

 

Border skirmishes continued throughout the 1980s, including a significant skirmish in April of

1984; this saw the first use of the Type 81 Assault Rifle by the Chinese. In 1999, after many years

of negotiations, China and Vietnam signed a border pact, though the line of demarcation

remained secret.^] There was a very slight adjustment of the land border at this time, resulting in

land being given back to China. Vietnam's official news service reported the actual

implementation of the new border around August 2001.

 

The Friendship Gate between

China and Vietnam

 

The war also resulted in the discrimination and consequent migration of Vietnam's

ethnic Chinese. Many of these people fled as "boat people" who eventually resettled

in Asian communities in Australia, Europe, North America, and back to China.

The Vietnamese government continuously requested an official apology from the Chinese

government for its invasion of Vietnam, but the Chinese government has never

apologized. After the normalization of relations between the two countries, Vietnam

officially dropped its demand for an apology.

 

A catalyst to improved relations between the two communist countries was the 1989

Tiananmen Square crackdown, at which point Vietnam showed strong support for the

Chinese measures, despite the fact that many Chinese officers who had served in the

Sino-Vietnamese War were active in suppressing the protest movement. Borders remained

militarized, however.

The December 2007 announcement of a plan to build a Hanoi-Kunming highway was a landmark

in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The road will traverse the border that once served as a

battleground. It should contribute to demilitarizing the border region, as well as facilitating trade

and industrial cooperation between the nations.

 

Sino Vietnamese Tensions Today

 

 

 What If China And Vietnam Went To War today ?

 

 

 

 South China Sea island building dispute:

Philippines vs China, Vietnam vs China